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THIN INCORPORATION: THE MAJOR TESTS
OF DEBT OR EQUITY FINANCING
Double taxation of corporate income under the Internal Revenue
Code not only leaves a bad taste in the mouths of most shareholding
taxpayers but constitutes probably the greatest single disadvantage
to the corporate form of business organization today. To what extent
the double tax bite influences decisions either in the formation or dis-
solution of corporations is not known. What is known is that share-
holding taxpayers very frequently have endeavored to alleviate their
predicament to some extent by means of advancing funds to their
corporations in the form of loans rather than as capital contributions.
In recent years a large number of cases have been litigated involving
the basic question of when these advancements must be treated for tax
purposes as creating equity ownership instead of normal debt obliga-
tion. The corporations involved in the cases holding that equity owner-
ship results are said to be "thinly incorporated." Neither this term
itself nor any section specifically covering the precise problem at hand
is to be found in the code. Nevertheless, the determination of whether
shareholders' advancements give rise to debt obligation or equity
ownership is of utmost importance, the more significant potential tax
consequences being as follows:
(1) If the advances are held to be loans, the corporation may deduct
as a business expense any interest paid on such loans.' Conversely, if
they are found to be contributions to equity, subsequent income distri-
butions thereon are dividends non-deductible by the corporation.
2
(2) When the principal amount of the advance is returned to the
shareholder, no taxable event occurs if the advance is considered to
have been a loan-the corporation is merely repaying its debt.3 On
the other hand, if held that the advance was to equity, then any repay-
ment out of profits or earnings will be treated as fully taxable divi-
dend income.4
(3) When the corporation has set aside funds to repay debts, such
funds may be taxed as an excess accumulation of earnings if the ad-
vances are determined to have been to equity. 5
1. See Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 163.
2. See, e.g., Ryan Contracting Corp., 25 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 795 (1956).
3. See, e.g., Vonnie M. Hicks, 26 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 89 (1957); John H.
Perkins, 26 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 465 (1957).
4. Weyher & Weithorn, Capital Structure of New Corporations, N.Y.U. 16th
Inst. on Fed. Tax. 277, 287 (1958).
5. See Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 531. See Smoot Sand & Gravel Corp., 25 P-H
Tax Ct. Mem. 330 (1956).
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(4) If the corporation should fail, it may be very advantageous to a
shareholder in the business of lending money to have his holdings in
the corporation treated as debt, since he then may be enabled to take
a business bad debt deduction in lieu of a capital loss.,
Because of the disparate treatment afforded debt and equity under
the code, it is manifest that whenever a shareholder advances funds
to his corporation in the form of a loan, a basis for potential contest
is laid. The purpose of this note is to assemble and examine, from the
standpoint of utility, the tests which the courts have used most fre-
quently to resolve the debt or equity question. Major emphasis upon
practical usefulness of the tests necessitates stating them in the form
in which the courts have most commonly generalized them, without
attempting an elaborate and exhaustive case-by-case analysis of the
historical development of each.7
The "true intent" of the shareholder at the time the purported loan
was made has frequently been looked to as a test.8 Formerly, securi-
ties issued to shareholders under equivocal conditions quite often pos-
sessed characteristics of both debt obligation and equity ownership,
and hence acquired the name "hybrid securities." In cases involving
6. Compare Int. Rev. Code of 1954, §§ 166(a) (1) and 165(f). It should be
noted that under the 1958 Technical Amendments, security in a "small business"
which becomes worthless is fully deductible in the same way as are business bad
debts. This new section has led some to comment that the appeal of debt financing
may be lessened somewhat, but it is suggested that only pessimists form corpora-
tions with the idea of failing, and it is only upon failure that the new section
comes into play. See Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 1244. For other tax consequences,
see Caplin, The Caloric Count of a Thin Incorporation, N.Y.U. 17th Inst. on Fed.
Tax. 771-74 (1959); Poindexter, Tax-Wise, 35 Taxes 880 (1957); Semmel, Tax
Consequences of Inadequate Capitalization, 48 Colum. L. Rev. 202, 203 (1948);
Spanbock, Carro & Katz, Nourishing the Thin Corporation, 34 Taxes 687n.1
(1956); Stefano, Stock or Debt-That Is the Question, 18 Fordham L. Rev. 251
(1949); Weyher & Weithorn, Capital Structure of New Corporations, N.Y.U. 16th
Inst. on Fed. Tax. 277, 287 (1958).
7. No effort will be made to treat exhaustively all of the tests that the courts
use in attempting to resolve the thin incorporation problem. Since the tests are
not formalized, the language of the various courts differs considerably. It is
believed that a close examination of these tests will show that most of those
which may appear to have been omitted from this note are actually included in
those specifically discussed, although the descriptive wording may not be the same.
Further, there will be no attempt to give a breakdown of the tests used at
virious times in each of the different courts. For an excellent treatment of this
area see Caplin, Caloric Count of a Thin Incorporation, N.Y.U. 17th Inst.
on Fed. Tax. 771 (1959).
8. E.g., Crawford Drug Stores, Inc. v. United States, 220 F.2d 292 (10th
Cir. 1955); Canton Tool Mfg. Co., 26 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 592 (1957); Alma de
Bretteville Spreckels, 18 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 971 (1949) (stating "for the
intention is the controlling factor"); Lucia Chase Ewing, 15 P-H Tax Ct. Mem.
801 (1946).
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such instruments it is necessary to look to all the surrounding cir-
cumstances to glean the true intent of the parties since the instru-
ments are ambiguous on their face. Of late, however, the purported
indebtedness more frequently has been evidenced by "entirely con-
ventional" debt instruments.9 In such cases the parties have mani-
fested objectively their "true intent" to create a debt. It is obvious
here that the problem is neither one of true nor of manifested intent,
but whether regardless of the parties' unambiguous manifestations of
intent there should be a particular classification for tax purposes. 10
To bridge the chasm between manifested intent and unknown "true
intent" the courts often have brought in other independent tests and
then stated, for instance, that the transaction was a "sham"" and the
true intent was other than made to appear. It is submitted that, realis-
tically, the courts here are relying on the independent tests in an en-
deavor to establish a set standard by which to make the debt or equity
determination irrespective of the parties' evidenced intent.12
The "debt-equity ratio" test is often applied when a corporation has
debt in excess of invested risk capital. 3 Prior to 1946 this test was
not stressed in the opinions, 14 but after John Kelley Co. v. Commis-
sioner"s it became of prime concern." As a result of this case it was
generally felt that a safe or reasonable ratio was about four to one,
i.e., a corporation's debt should not exceed four times its invested risk
9. E.g., Kraft Foods Co. v. Commissioner, 232 F.2d 118 (2d Cir. 1956);
Texoma Supply Co., 27 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 58 (1958).
10. Ibid.
11. See, e.g., Benjamin D. Gilbert, 25 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 551 (1956), rem'd,
248 F.2d 399 (2d Cir. 1957), modified on rehearing, 27 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 23
(1958), aff'd, 262 F.2d 512 (2 Cir. 1959).
12. There is a further way of viewing the intent test. The primary intent
or expectation of the shareholder who advances funds to his corporation in the
form of debt is always that such sums receive a debt treatment by the Com-
missioner. It is felt that this will be true equally of the "bona fide" creditor
and the "sham" creditor for they are both seeking to avoid the double taxation
of corporate income. Thus, when the courts look to intent it would appear that
the same answer should be forthcoming from every situation. If this be true,
it is clear that the intent test is of little value in deteridning what the advances
are to be termed for tax purposes.
13. E.g., John W. Walter, Inc., 23 T.C. 550 (1954); Isidor Dobkin, 15 T.C. 31
(1950), aff'd per curiam, 192 F.2d 392 (2d Cir. 1951); Swoby Corp., 9 T.C. 887
(1947).
14. See, e.g., Commissioner v. Meridian & Thirteenth Realty Co., 132 F.2d
182 (7th Cir. 1942); Commissioner v. Schmoll Fils Associated, 110 F.2d 611
(2d Cir. 1940).
15. 326 U.S. 521 (1946), reversing 146 F.2d 466 (7th Cir. 1944), reversing
1 T.C. 457 (1943).
16. See generally Caplin, The Caloric Count of a Thin Incorporation, N.Y.U.
17th Inst. on Fed Tax. 771, 777-84 (1959).
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capital.17 Thus, if the corporate financial structure were within this
range, shareholder advances would be treated as debt with little or no
regard to other tests. However, this safe ratio theory has been weak-
ened, if not negatived, by recent cases in which shareholder advances
were held contributions to equity despite the fact that the ratio was
well under four to one. 8 In view of these cases it appears that empha-
sis on the debt-equity ratio test has diminished to the extent that it is
being considered now as just one of the various tests, and not conclu-
sive in and of itself.
In using the debt-equity ratio test, courts face the difficult problem
of having to assign a value to the debt and equity components. The
standard of measurement to be employed can be of controlling effect,
since two courts on the same set of facts could easily reach different
results depending upon the standard utilized. In valuing corporate
property, the present trend is towards use of market value as the
measure rather than book value.19 This is the more realistic approach,
inasmuch as book value seldom represents true present worth of cor-
porate property. It would seem equally realistic to consider good will
and other intangibles in computing the value of equity components.2
Problems of even greater complexity are encountered when the courts
attempt to figure the total debt of the corporation.-
17. Weyher & Weithorn, Capital Structure of New Corporations, N.Y.U.
16th Inst. on Fed. Tax. 277, 293 (1958). See Rabin, Fat Advantages of the
Thin Corporation, 32 Taxes 572, 574 (1954); Semmel, Tax Consequences of
Inadequate Capitalization, 48 Colum. L. Rev. 202 (1948).
18. See Benjamin D. Gilbert, 25 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 551 (1956), rem'd, 248
F.2d 399 (2d Cir. 1957), modified on rehearing, 27 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 23 (1958),
aff'd, 262 F.2d 512 (2d Cir. 1959); Gooding Amusement Co., 236 F.2d 159 (6th
Cir. 1956), affirming 23 T.C. 408 (1954).
19. Bittker, Thin Capitalization: Some Current Questions, 34 Taxes 830-32
(1956); Weyher & Weithorn, Capital Structure of New Corporations, N.Y.U.
16th Inst. on Fed. Tax. 277, 295-96 (1958).
20. Caplin, The Caloric Count of a Thin Incorporation, N.Y.U. 17th Inst. on
Fed. Tax. 771, 779 (1959); Spanbock, Carro & Katz, Nourishing the Thin
Corporation, 34 Taxes 687, 689-91 (1956).
21. One of the most difficult of such problems is whether to include outside
creditors' advances to the corporation in arriving at a figure for "debt." If this
is done, the debt figure will be higher in relation to the equity figure. This
increased ratio will tend to move the courts in the direction of treating the
shareholders' purported loans as equity; but note, even though the advances
of the outside lenders were included to arrive at a figure, it is only the share-
holders' advances that the court will treat as contributions to equity. It is
suggested that this lacks logical justification.
Another way of viewing the same situation is to note specially the presence
of the outside lenders. This factor could then be used as a possible justifying
basis for the validity of shareholder loans, thus giving the opposite effect of
that in the preceding paragraph.
A related problem is that of shareholders guaranteeing loans of outside
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1959/iss4/5
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The use of a fixed ratio as a test is subject to obvious criticisms.
Corporations could pursue a purposeful tax avoidance scheme merely
by establishing a financial position consistent with the fixed ratio and
then justify what otherwise would be an excessive debt-equity ratio
by pointing out that they were within the approved limits.2 2 This, of
course, should be tolerated no more than unfavorable tax treatment of
loans made justifiably over a fixed ratio. It is suggested that the only
fair way to consider debt-equity ratio in determining whether share-
holder advances are bona fide loans is to consider in each case all sur-
rounding circumstances and factors which bear on the desirability or
non-desirability of debt over equity financing.23 Special emphasis
should be placed upon the nature of the particular business enterprise
and the industry in which it operates, for, clearly, certain businesses
lend themselves much more readily to extensive debt financing than do
others. In any event, the debt-equity ratio test should be used with a
high degree of care.
As noted previously, the debt-equity ratio test is generally being
used at present not as conclusive in itself but merely as one test to be
used in conjunction with others. This seems clearly to reflect the
courts' recognition of the fallibility of the test and shows further the
necessity that it be used with extreme care. However, there is one
area in which it is believed that regular use of this test would bring
about more equitable results-that of mitigating the penalty. Pres-
ently, once it is determined that the advances were to equity, the
courts' tendency is to treat the entire sum as a capital contribution.24
This produces an unnecessarily harsh result. It is submitted that the
courts should determine first what constitutes a reasonable debt-equity
ratio in the particular case and then give capital treatment only to
that portion of the advance which exceeds such ratio.2 5
creditors. There has been a recent trend to look on such guaranteed loans
as being actually those of the guaranteeing shareholder rather than those of
the lender. Carried to its obvious conclusion, this approach would mean that
if the courts determined that the guaranteed funds were contributions to equity,
then the guaranteeing shareholder would be taxed for constructive receipt of
dividends when the corporation repaid the lender. See Holzman, The Current
Trend in Guaranty Cases: An Impetus to Thin-Incorporation?, 11 Tax L. Rev.
29 (1955).
22. Bryson, Stockholder Loans: "Thin" Capitalizations, N.Y.U. 8th Inst. on
Fed. Tax. 732, 742 (1950).
23. See Rowan v. United States, 219 F.2d 51 (5th Cir. 1955).
24. There are, however, a few cases that have held part of the advances
to be equity and part debt. E.g., George J. Schaefer, 24 T.C. 638 (1955).
25. A justifying analogy may be drawn to cases where courts, absent a
statute, have declared void only that portion of a conveyance which violated the
Rule Against Perpetuities. It might also be noted that there have been sugges-
tions that different types of debt be utilized to permit the courts to adopt this
Washington University Open Scholarship
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Courts sometimes have considered as a test whether funds were
advanced to the corporation with due regard to normal creditor safe-
guards.2 ; If outside money lenders would not have loaned funds under
similar circumstances, the test is not met and the purported loans
must be treated as contributions to capital. This test, bluntly applied,
fails to make allowance for a factor that often is controlling in the
situations in which the test is held not met. For in many situations
involving shareholders' purported loans, the corporation is closely
held and the shareholders are active in the business as directors, offi-
cers or both. Obviously the future of such a corporation is within the
hands of the shareholders, the shareholders being largely masters of
their own business fate. Since outside creditors are not close to the
organization and have little control over its policies and decisions,
they must take the extreme precautions of requiring security and care-
fully checking the rating and financial condition of the corporation
before extending loans. It is submitted that equating the positions of
shareholders with those of outside lenders is therefore a highly un-
realistic and non-functional approach, and the test of whether there
was due regard to normal creditor safeguards accordingly should be
used, if at all, with great caution.
Another test which some courts have used has been to determine
whether the shareholders' purported loans are "proportionate" or
"disproportionate" to their respective shareholdings.27 The applica-
tion and significance of this test may be shown by considering the
following illustration: Assume that A and B are the sole and equal
owners (shareholders) of the AB Corporation. A advances money to
the corporation. What will be the thoughts of B in regard to this ad-
vance of funds by A? He will first consider the effect on his present
equal ownership. If the business is a going one, it is not reasonable
that B would allow A to gain greater control of the corporation by
virtue of an increased equity holding. Thus, it is inferable that A's
disproportionate advance was a loan.28 B will also consider his rela-
tive risk position to that of A in event the business should fail.20 The
fact which prompts this thought is that in most cases of corporate in-
view more readily. See, e.g., Caplin, The Caloric Count of a Thin Incorporation,
N.Y.U. 17th Inst. on Fed. Tax. 771, 823 (1959).
26. E.g., Benjamin D. Gilbert, 25 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 551 (1956), rem'd, 248
F.2d 399 (2d Cir. 1957), modified on rehearing, 27 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 2 (1958),
aff'd, 262 F.2d 512 (2d Cir. 1959); Martin Ai. Dittmar, 23 T.C. 789 (1955).
27. E.g., Hilbert L. Bair, 16 T.C. 90 (1951), aff'd 199 F.2d (2d Cir. 1952);
1432 Broadway Corp., 4 T.C. 1158 (1945), aff'd 160 F.2d 885 (2d Cir. 1947);
R. E. Nelson, 19 T.C. 575 (1952).
28. See, e.g., Sabine Royalty Corp., 17 T.C. 1071 (1951); H. E. Fletcher Co.,
20 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 940 (1951).
29. Cf., Sabine Royalty Corp., supra note 28; Dayton & Michigan R.R., 12
F.2d 627 (4th Cir. 1940), affirming 40 B.T.A. 857 (1939).
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solvency or bankruptcy, the creditors of the corporation have priority
over the shareholders. It is conceivable that, on failure of the busi-
ness, B as a shareholder would salvage nothing of his investment while
A as a shareholder-creditor would share to the extent of his advance in
the corporate assets with the other creditors. Therefore, B would
realize that if he allows A to build a debt account, the risk of failure
is no longer being shared equally between them. Thus it may be seen
that if B is willing, in spite of his inferior risk position, to treat A's
advance as a loan, the court could draw a valid inference that such
advance was in fact a loan.
If, on the other hand, both A and B made purported loans "propor-
tionate" to their equity holdings-in equal amounts in this example-
no inference should arise on this fact alone, since their respective
control and risk positions remain the same.30 Thus, it would appear
that the proportionate-disproportionate test would have valid pro-
bative significance only when the shareholders' advances were dispro-
portionate to their equity positions.
A test which is related to that of intent, but apparently distinct
from it, looks to "tax avoidance motives." 31 The Supreme Court, how-
ever, in Gregory v. Helvering- stated that a taxpayer has the right,
within the scope of the law, to limit or avoid taxes.33 Certainly this is
a reasonable position, for once a shareholder decides for whatever
purpose to make advances to his corporation it is inconceivable in this
"tax age" that he would ignore a possible tax savings route. On the
other hand, it seems equally reasonable to require of the taxpayer that
some valid "business purpose" accompany his tax avoidance motive to
enable advanced funds to be treated as debt.34 Thus, it is considered
30. Maloney v. Spencer, 172 F.2d 638 (9th Cir. 1949), affirming 73 F. Supp.
657 (N.D. Ore. 1947). Contra, Hilbert L. Bair, 16 T.C. 90 (1951), aff'd, 190
F.2d 589 (2d Cir. 1952); Isidor Dobkin, 15 T.C. 31 (1950), aff'd per curiam,
192 F.2d 392 (2d Cir. 1951).
31. E.g., Talbot Mills v. Commissioner, 3 T.C. 95, aff'd, 146 F.2d 809 (1st
Cir. 1944), aff'd, 326 U.S. 521 (1946). But see Kraft Foods Co. v. Commissioner,
232 F.2d 118 (2d Cir. 1956), reversing 21 T.C. 513 (1954).
32. 293 U.S. 465 (1935).
33. Id. at 469.
34. See Talbot Mills v. Commissioner, 3 T.C. 95, aff'd, 156 F.2d 809 (1st Cir.
1944), aff'd, 326 U.S. 521 (1946). See also Gilbert v. Commissioner, 248 F.2d 399,
412 (2d Cir. 1957), wherein Judge Hand in a dissenting opinion proffered the
following test which may be construed as requiring a business purpose: "When
the petitioners decided to make their advances in the form of debts, rather than
of capital advances, did they suppose that the difference would appreciably
affect their beneficial interests in the venture, other than taxwise?" But see
John Kelley Co. v. Commissioner, 326 U.S. 521 (1946), reversing 146 F.2d 466
(7th Cir. 1944), reversing 1 T.C. 457 (1943). The Tax Court said, "It is
apparent that the holders of the preferred stock.., preferred the debtor-creditor
status of debenture holders to that of stockholders, and stockholders have the
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that this test can serve a useful function in assuring the taxpayer that
the mere presence of a tax avoidance motive will not of itself be de-
cisive against him, but if such was the sole motivating factor, the
court may properly hold that the advances were to equity.
Another test utilized by the courts when possible is whether the
shareholders' purported loans have been subordinated to subsequent
loans by outside creditors.35 On failure of a corporation, creditors
usually take precedence over shareholders in recouping their invest-
ment. If there was subordination of the purported loans to outside
indebtedness, the effect is to place the shareholders' rights with re-
spect to those purported loans more on a par with their rights as
equity investors. Hence it may reasonably be inferred that the pur-
ported loans were in truth risk capital, i.e., equity.-6
Courts sometimes look to the formality of corporate minutes and
financial records to make the debt or equity determination." It is be-
lieved that this test is of slight value in the majority of cases, since
it takes little time or effort to record formally the "authorization and
purpose" of a purported loan in the minutes, or to make book accounts
giving the formal appearance of indebtedness. The presence of such
formalities may tell the investigator nothing except that the officers
and directors of the corporation had good legal advice or were in-
formed individuals themselves. The absence of formalities likewise
may tell little in view of the informal manner in which many small
corporations are operated. Any inference drawn by use of this test
would be tenuous at best, and it is suggested therefore that presence or
absence of formalities should be viewed only as one among other more
relevant factors to be considered.
The test of whether there is a note or a bond evidencing the pur-
ported debt has also been used.38 It appears that little need be said
right to change to the creditor-debtor basis, though the reason may be purely
personal to the parties concerned." 1 T.C. at 462.
35. E.g., Wetterau Grocer Co. v. Commissioner, 179 F.2d 158 (8th Cir.
1950), affirming 18 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 381 (1949); 1432 Broadway Corp., 4 T.C.
1158 (1945), aff'd per curiam, 160 F.2d 885 (2d Cir. 1947). But see Lansing
Community Hotel Corp., 14 T.C. 183 (1950), aff'd per curiam, 187 F.2d 487
(6th Cir. 1951).
36. It should be noted that in certain cases this policy may work hardship
on corporations with shareholder advances in the form of loans, for there are
probably few financial institutions which will e-xtend funds to a corporation
if not placed on a level superior to that of shareholder-creditors. Weyher &
Weithorn, Capital Structure of New Corporations, N.Y.U. 16th Inst. on Fed.
Tax. 277, 290 (1958).
37. E.g., Erard A. Matthiessen, 16 T.C. 781 (1951), aff'd, 194 F.2d 659 (2d
Cir. 1952); Martin M. Dittmar, 23 T.C. 789 (1955).
38. E.g., Mullin Bldg. Corp., 9 T.C. 350 (1947), aff'd per curiam, 167 F.2d
1001 (3d Cir. 1948); 1432 Broadway Corp., 4 T.C. 1158 (1945), afFd per curiam,
160 F.2d 885 (2d Cir. 1957).
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about this test since there can be, and frequently is, a binding debtor-
creditor relationship with no writing present. An alternative to issu-
ance of notes or bonds is simply to create an account payable in favor
of the purported creditor. Similarly, it is clear that notes or bonds
could be issued easily for no purpose other than appearance, with no
necessity or intention of enforcement. However, when notes or bonds
are present, some courts consider whether there is a due date, an in-
terest provision, a provision for repayment of the note upon demand
before its due date (upon default), and other "arm's length" pro-
visions. 39 As with the test of the formality of records, it is too easy to
meet all of these requirements and yet still be without a true debtor-
creditor relationship. As noted above, such notes may be issued to a
shareholder who lacks all intention to enforce the denominated pro-
visions.
If the interest on or principal of the purported loan becomes due
and the shareholder enforces the obligation, the inference is drawn
by many courts that a true debtor-creditor relationship exists.40 This
test considers primarily whether the shareholder created a debt with
the purpose that it be enforced regardless of the success or failure of
the business. It is believed that the test is one of the most realistic
and useful, for the inference is drawn from an affirmative act which
is completely consonant with a bona fide debtor-creditor relationship,
i.e., actual enforcement of the obligation.
Most of the statutes that have been proposed as solutions to the
problem of thin incorporation have included one or more of the above
tests in addition to standard requisites for the recognition of a debt.41
They will, therefore, not be discussed, for the same criticisms levelled
against the tests are equally applicable to the proposed statutes. Fur-
thermore, it is believed that justice will be better served if a statute is
not adopted in this area, for the predictability which might thus be
gained would be at the expense of much preferred flexibility.
In conclusion, the courts often face the problem of determining
whether a debt, as the term is used in the code, exists between a share-
holder and his corporation. To make such determination many tests
have been employed but, as shown, several lack a realistic basis. It is
felt that one possible method whereby the courts could gain a degree
of predictability without sacrificing needed flexibility would be to re-
39. E.g., Toledo Blade Co., 11 T.C. 1079 (1948), aff'd, 180 F.2d 357 (6th
Cir. 1950); Mullin Bldg. Corp., 9 T.C. 350 (1947), aff'd per curiam, 167 F.2d
1001 (3d Cir. 1948).
40. E.g., Benjamin D. Gilbert, 25 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 551 (1956), rem'd, 248
F.2d 399 (2d Cir. 1957), modified on rehearing, 27 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 23 (1958),
aff'd, 262 F.2d 512 (2d Cir. 1959).
41. For a discussion of several such statutes see Caplin, The Caloric Count
of a Thin Incorporation, N.Y.U. 17th Inst. on Fed. Tax. 771, 813-17 (1959).
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turn to the "age of ratios." The ratio test should be used, however, in
the fashion described herein,42 not in the manner that previously was
employed. In addition to using the ratio test, it is suggested that the
courts require a valid "business purpose" to be present in the trans-
action under scrutiny. Finally, if interest or principal has become
due, heavy emphasis should be placed on whether the payment was
enforced by the shareholder. After considering these three primary
tests, the courts should look, if necessary, to the tests of whether the
advances were disproportionate and whether there was subordination
to debts of subsequent outside creditors. The use of the other tests, it
is felt, should be sharply limited, and in many cases it appears prefer-
able that such tests be abandoned entirely.
42. See the discussion of the use of the debt-equity ratio test in text supported
by notes 13-25 supra.
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